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ANTITRUST LAW: PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARD
REQUIREMENTS IN CONCERTED REFUSALS TO
DEAL: AN APPLICATION TO PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS-DENVER ROCKETS V. ALL-PRO
MANAGEMENT, INC. (C.D. CAL. 1971).
Professional sports are a continually growing source of enter-
tainment for millions of Americans. Going hand in hand with this
growth has been a number of complex and heretofore unresolved
legal disputes. Perhaps the most important of these disputes is
the role that antitrust laws will play in the area of professional
sport leagues and associations. For example, it is argued that pro-
visions such as reserve and option clauses, college player drafts
and eligibility requirements are designed to increase integrity and
competition in the leagues, a necessity for maximum fan enthusi-
asm and a successful sports industry. Others believe that these
regulations are unduly restrictive towards athletes, are necessary.
only to increase the profit of the hierarchy of professional sports,-
and are violative of the antitrust laws. The debate and litigation
is continuing. In Flood v. Kuhn,' a case which many thought
would provide a solution in this area, the Supreme Court of the
United States failed once again to give an adequate answer to
the question of antitrust laws as applied to professional sports.2
Nonetheless, the extent of the antitrust laws' role in the sports in-
dustry must be decided if one is to chart the future of professional
sports in this country. A possible indication of future judicial re-
sponse in this area has emerged in Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Man-
agement, Inc. (Haywood).3 In that case, the court found an estab-
lished National Basketball Association4 rule to be in violation of
1. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
2. The court rested its decision on an exemption that baseball has
long enjoyed from the antitrust laws. See Federal Baseball Club v. Na-
tional League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); Toolson v. New York Yankees Inc.,
346 U.S. 356 (1953).
3. 325 F. Supp. 1049 (1971). The case was concerned with litigation
between Spencer Haywood, the National Basketball Association and the
Denver Rockets.
4. Hereinafter cited as N.B.A.
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the antitrust laws and declared the rule illegal. The significance
of the Haywood court's analysis is found in the tremendous impact
that the decision should have on the entire professional sport in-
dustry.
The Haywood case revolves around the N.B.A.'s four-year college
rule.5 The rule does not permit an athlete to play with any N.B.A.
team until his high school class would graduate from college, re-
gardless of the fact that a particular athlete may choose not to at-
tend college. This provision is designed to prevent professional
teams from negotiating for a ballplayer's services while he remains
in school, presumably for the protection of the student-athlete. An
interesting series of occurrences led Spencer Haywood to attack
this rule in a court of law.
In 1970, HaywoodO entered into a lucrative contract with the
Denver Rockets of the American Basketball Association.7 When
Haywood discovered that he would never realize the full compen-
5. The specific provisions under attack are Sections 2.05 and 6.03 of
the National Basketball Association By-laws.
Section 2.05: "High School Graduate, etc. A person who has not com-
pleted high school or who has completed high school but has not entered
college, shall not be eligible to be drafted or to be a Player until four
years after he has been graduated or four years after his original high
school class has been graduated, as the case may be, nor may the future
services of any such person be negotiated or contracted for, or otherwise
reserved. Similarly, a person who has entered college but is no longer
enrolled, shall not be eligible to be drafted or to be a Player until the time
when he would have first become eligible had he remained enrolled in
college. Any negotiations or agreements with any such person during
such periods shall be null and void and shall confer no rights whatso-
ever; nor shall a Member violating the provisions of this paragraph be
permitted to acquire the rights to the services of such person at any time
thereafter."
Section 6.03: "Persons Elgible for Draft. The following classes of persons
shall be eligible for the annual draft:
a) Students in four year colleges whose classes are to be gradu-
ated during the June following the holding of the draft;
b) Students in four year colleges whose original classes have al-
ready been graduated, and who do not choose to exercise re-
maining collegiate basketball eligibility;
c) Students in four year colleges whose original classes have al-
ready been graduated if such students have no remaining col-
legiate basketball eligibility;
d) Persons who become eligible pursuant to the provisions of Sec-
tion 2.05 of the By-laws."
6. Haywood is a basketball player with tremendous talent. His playing
ability has not and can not be questioned. Among his accomplishments
are: Junior College and Major College All-American, outstanding basket-
ball performer in the 1968 Olympics, leading scorer, rebounder, Rookie
of the Year, and Most Valuable Player in the American Basketball
Association during the 1969-70 season.
7. 325 F. Supp. at 1052-1054.
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sation promised him, he rescinded his contractual ties with the
Rockets, refusing under any circumstances to render his services
for that team. Late in 1970, Haywood signed a contract with the
Seattle Supersonics of the rival N.B.A.; however, N.B.A. Commis-
sioner Walter Kennedy, noting that Haywood's high school class
had yet to graduate from college, invoked the four-year rule,
thereby declaring Haywood ineligible to compete for the Seattle
team.8 The issue was whether application of antitrust provisions
would render the four-year rule illegal. Judge Ferguson, issuing
a partial summary judgment in favor of Haywood, stated
1. Section 2.05 and 6.03 of the by-laws of the National Basketball
Association are declared to be illegal under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. §19
The Haywood decision left no doubt that Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act'0 was applicable to professional basketball. In dealing
with this preliminary issue, the court noted that for the Act to
apply: ". . . (1) There must be some effect on 'trade or commerce
among the several States', and (2) there must be sufficient agree-
ment to constitute a 'contract, combination . . . or conspiracy' 15
U.S.C. § 1."'11 There can be little serious argument with the court's
reasoning that the nationwide activity of professional basketball,
specifically the N.B.A., coupled with the agreement of concerted
action on the part of the N.B.A. teams, through the league's by-
laws, clearly brings professional basketball under § 1 of the Sher-
man Act.12 Although it is evident that the N.B.A.'s four-year rule
falls under the auspices of the Sherman Act, the question of
whether the rule is in violation of the Act remains.
Judge Ferguson defined the four-year rule in terms of a con-
8. After much litigation, Haywood was granted an injunction which
allowed him to compete for the Seattle Supersonics pending final deter-
mination of his action. Haywood v. National Basketball Association, 401
U.S. 1204 (1971).
9. 325 F. Supp. at 1067.
10. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal..." Sherman Act
§1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended 15 U.S.C. §1-7 (1970).
11. 325 F. Supp. at 1062.
12. The lack of interstate commerce was the rationale used to grant
baseball its exception to the antitrust laws, and is generally regarded as
an aberration. See Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S.
200 (1922); Toolson v. New York Yankees Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
certed refusal to deal.1 3 That is, ". . . the actors at one level of a
trade pattern (NBA team members) refuse to deal with an actor
at another level (those ineligible under the NBA's four year
rule) .'14 The fact that the N.B.A. will deal with any athlete if he
meets the prerequisite condition of being out of high school for
four years makes little difference, as it has long been held that a
group's refusal to deal except on certain terms falls under the
definition of a concerted refusal to deal.15 At this point in Hay-
wood, the court, for the first time, defined the principal contro-
versy in the case as being whether the N.B.A. could justify its ac-
tions by alleging reasonableness and necessity or whether all con-
certed refusals to deal are illegal per se.
Haywood refused to extend a test of reasonableness to all group
boycotts. This so-called rule of reason was first introduced early
in the history of antitrust law by Standard Oil Co. v. U.S.' 0 which
sought to define antitrust violations in terms of weighing the pos-
sible justifications of an act against the potential harm which it
may cause.17 In following what has become a standard argument
in order to discount this theory, Haywood noted that a determina-
tion of all relevant facts and individual motives in many cases,
Haywood included, would be a tremendously difficult, if not im-
possible, task for a court of law. Moreover, due to the fact that
this apparent difficulty outweighs any potential benefits derived
from concerted refusals to deal, group boycotts are one category of
antitrust violations held to be illegal per se.'8
Fashion Originators' Guild v. F.T.C.19 and Klor's, Inc. v. Broad-
way-Hale Stores, Inc.20 were cited in Haywood as cases supporting
the premise that all concerted refusals to deal are illegal per se,2 1
13. Throughout this article the term "group boycott" will be used inter-
changeably with the term "concerted refusal to deal."
14. 325 F. Supp. at 1061.
15. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
16. 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1910).
17. "The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such
as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine
that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the
business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual
or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be
attained, are all relevant facts." Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,
246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
18. 325 F. Supp. at 1063-1064.
19. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
20. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
21. Standard Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912), may
have been one of the first cases expounding such a theory. The court speak-
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and there is little doubt that these cases did, at least in dictum,
stand for such a premise. In Fashion Originators, possible good
intentions or valid moral reasons were insufficient to offset the ille-
gality of a group boycott.22 In Klor's the court found that group
boycotts ". . . have not been saved by allegations that they were
reasonable in the specific circumstances .... -23 Thus, there is
illegality in these cases regardless of reasonable motives or intent.
Although Fashion Originators and Klor's do not stand alone,24 such
a strict approach to an area of law presents potential problems.
For example, in Molinas v. National Basketball Association,25 Mo-
linas, a professional basketball player was barred from further
participation in the N.B.A. for admittedly gambling on league
games. This league action was in effect a concerted refusal to deal
on the part of the N.B.A. against Molinas. If a per se approach
were adopted by the court, as Molinas argued it should be, the ac-
tion taken by the N.B.A. would necessarily be declared illegal, deal-
ing a severe blow to the integrity of the sport. Perhaps in recog-
nition of this problem, the Molinas court completely avoided any
mention of the per se doctrine and instead explained that the
N.B.A.'s ruling was clearly reasonable and should be upheld.
26
Other cases support Molinas' apparent application of the rule of
reason in group boycott situations. In Deesen v. Professional Golf
Association of America27 the governing body of professional golf
chose to take the "approved player" status from golfer Herbert
Deesen, thereby making it impossible for him to pursue a perma-
nent career as a touring golf professional. Although the Associa-
tion's action was not arbitrary,28 Deesen argued that since there
ing of the Sherman Act, stated that the Act "can't be evaded by good mo-
tives. The law is its own measure of right and wrong, of what it permits, or
forbids, and the judgment of the courts cannot be set up against it in a sup-
posed accommodation of its policy with the good intention to parties, and
it may be, of some good results." Id. at 49.
22. 312 U.S. at 468.
23. 359 U.S. at 212.
24. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963);
Washington State Bowling Proprietors v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371
(9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966).
25. 190 F. Supp. 241 (1961).
26. Id. at 244.
27. 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966).
28. The Professional Golf Association took care in considering all rele-
vant facts concerning the particular circumstances surrounding Deesen
prior to reaching their decision. Id. at 167-168.
was a concerted refusal to deal on the part of the Professional Golf
Association, the action should be illegal per se. The court, how-
ever, held that an association is entitled to adopt reasonable meas-
ures in order to promote integrity and competition in the sport and
that the action against Deesen was such a measure.2 In Florists'
Nationwide Telephone Delivery Network v. Florists' Telegraph De-
livery Association (F.N.T.D.N. v. F.T.D.A.)8 0 the rule of reason was
applied 3' in upholding certain regulations of F.T.D., -defined by the
court as group boycotts, which allegedly impaired F.N.T.D.N.'s
business. That court specifically rejected the per se theory and
distinguished itself from Fashion Originators and Klor's by stating
that "[t]he classes of restraints involved [in Fashion Originators
and Klor's] were on their face unduly restrictive in relation to the
particular industry. 3 2 This authority would indeed have allowed
the Haywood court to determine the legality of the four-year rule
in light of the rule of reason.
Although Haywood refuted the rule of reason, the court did fore-
see that possible problems might arise through the use of a strict
per se approach, thereby necessitating a compromise position.
Haywood found an answer in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange.""
In that case the Supreme Court of the United States adopted the
position that group boycotts are illegal per se ". . . absent any
justification derived from the policy of another statute or other-
wise.' '" 4 Commentators have agreed that the term "otherwise" re-
fers to industries, such as sport leagues and associations, whose
structure necessitates self-regulation. 35 Although the leagues may
enjoy exemption from per se illegality, Silver still requires more
than merely a test of reasonable actions with minimum restraint.
Specifically, Silver pronounces a requirement of procedural due
process if a concerted refusal to deal is to be upheld by the courts
as justifiable. Following this line of reasoning, Haywood adopts a
29. Id. at 170.
30. 371 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 909 (1967).
31. "We perceive nothing in the case which impairs the validity of
Board of Trade, supra." Id. at 269; see Chicago Board of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
32. 371 F.2d at 268.
33. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
34. Id. at 348.
35. See Bird, Sherman Act Limitation on Non-Commercial Concerted
Refusals to Deal, 1970 DuxE L.J. 247, 290 (1970); Note, Association Exclu-
sionary Practices: An Affirmative Role for the Rule of Reason, 66 CoLum.
L. Rnv. 1486, 1505-1506 (1966). "A similar standard would prevail where
collective action is inherent in the basic structure of the industry; a goal
prompted by the economic necessity of ordering competition within the
market would be justified." Id.
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three part exception to the per se rule: (1) There must be legisla-
tion allowing an industry to regulate itself or the structure of an
industry must necessitate self-regulation; (2) The goals and imple-
mentation of the collective action must be reasonable and restraint
must be at a minimum and (3) Procedural due process must be af-
forded to a "victim" of a group boycott.36 If these points are satis-
fied then, and only then, will the rule of reason be applicable to
group boycott situations and justification for the act may be pos-
sible.37 Since there was no opportunity for Haywood to present
any case to the N.B.A., the four-year rule failed to meet the pro-
cedural due process requirement.
There are several reasons presented by Silver, and adopted sub
silentio by Haywood, which support the need for a procedural due
process requirement.3 8 There is little doubt that mandatory pro-
cedural due process provisions will heighten the integrity of an
association, be it the New York Stock Exchange or the National
Basketball Association by keeping unsupported accusations and ac-
tions at a minimum, 39 and providing an antitrust court with a bet-
ter foundation on which to base its decision.
[T]he affording of procedural safeguards not only will substan-
tively encourage the lessening of anticompetitive behavior out-
lawed by the Sherman Act but will allow the antitrust court to
perform its function effectively. 40
There are objections to the procedural due process requirement
of Silver which the Haywood court failed to enunciate. A specific
problem was raised in Silver's dissenting opinion to the effect that
".... there might be cases in which the public interest would de-
mand that at least preliminary disciplinary action be taken with
swift effectiveness."'" Such a situation may well have occurred in
Molinas where there was a necessity for a self-admitted gambler
36. 325 F. Supp. at 1064-1065.
37. It appears that if all three of the points that Haywood puts forth
have been met, legality under the rule of reason will follow.
38. 373 U.S. at 362-363.
39. The dispute between the N.B.A. and Connie Hawkins is a sobering
example of the tremendous harm that can be done by dispensing with pro-
cedural- safeguards. See D. WOLF, FouL! THE CoNIE HAwiN~s STORY
(1972).
40. 373 U.S. at 363.
41. Id. at 368 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
to be deemed ineligible to participate in the N.B.A. in order to up-
hold the integrity of basketball. Although an opportunity to be
heard necessitated by procedural due process need not be overly
time consuming, it could well be argued that cases such as Molinas
demand immediate action. The majority opinion in Silver also
touched upon this problem by concluding that the Security Ex-
change could offer no justification for acting against Silver without
affording him notice and an opportunity to be heard.4 2 Is the court
conceding that the lack of procedural due process would be accept-
able if justification were offered? While the court noted that it
was not the antitrust laws which required procedural safeguards,
justification of a concerted refusal to deal was considered to be im-
possible without such a requirement.43 Perhaps Silver's due proc-
ess requirement should be looked at as just one additional factor
which may be considered in applying the rule of reason to a group
boycott situation. However, the Haywood court, without address-
ing itself to this problem, agreed with the majority view in this
area of the law: Justification of a concerted refusal to deal without
procedural due process is not possible. Thus, Haywood, although
cognizant of the exception from a per se approach for the profes-
sional basketball leagues, declared the four-year rule illegal due to
lack of procedural safeguards and without giving any consideration
to the reasonableness, necessity or intent of the rule.
Haywood may have attempted to add some justification for its
decision in an attempt to avoid controversy in both the legal and
sport circles.44 The court tried to reconcile two seemingly oppo-
site decisions in the area of group boycotts, Deesen and Washing-
ton State Bowling Proprietors Inc. v. Pacific Lanes Inc. 45 In the
former decision, as previously mentioned, a professional golfer's
"approved player" status was removed and the action was upheld
by the court. Haywood analyzed this case by stating: a) the indus-
try structure of professional golf necessitated self-regulation, b)
the specific action taken by the Professional Golf Association was
reasonably related to a proper goal (increased competition in tour-
naments) and c) Deesen was given an opportunity to present his
42. Id. at 365.
43. Id. at 364-365.
44. Indeed controversy did arise. For example, Pete Rozelle, Commis-
sioner of the National Football League, reacted to the Haywood decision
by stating, "I can't believe a practice that is for the protection of the
colleges could be legally ruled invalid. If it could be, of course, it would
no doubt destroy college football and basketball." quoted in SPORTS ILL.,
April 12, 1971, at 35. Obviously Mr. Rozelle's view, and many others of
similar nature, are a bit extreme.
45. 356 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966).
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case before a Professional Golf Association committee. 46 In Wash-
ington Bowling the association restricted its tournaments to bowlers
who had not participated in organized bowling in nonmember
establishments. 47 That court refused to allow the association's
actions and declared such practice illegal.45  Again, Haywood
analyzed this decision in terms of its earlier reasoning, explaining
that in Washington Bowling there was no provision for procedural
due process as found in Deesen, thereby rendering the decision con-
sistent with Haywood.49 This attempt at reconciliation, although
superficially valid, is not entirely in accord with the cases them-
selves. In Deesen the court makes no mention of a per se approach
to group boycotts, or any exceptions thereto, instead relying solely
on the rule of reason.50 Conversely, in Washington Bowling the
court followed a strict per se theory, without regard to any re-
quirement of procedural safeguards,51 and further discounted the
possibility that reasonableness of the association's actions was rele-
vant to the outcome.52 Taken together, the decisions indicate that,
regardless of Haywood's analysis, there are several approaches to
the legality of concerted refusals to deal. Moreover, if Haywood
is attempting to show that its line of reasoning has been uncon-
sciously followed in previous cases, an impossible task is faced in
reconciling Molinas. Although Molinas' admission was a distin-
guishing feature of that case, procedural due process requirements
were nonetheless found to be unnecessary, at least in this one in-
stance.53
Haywood briefly concluded that even if procedural safeguards
were not required, the four-year rule should be declared illegal.
The court commented on the broadness of the rule, which applied
to athletes who do not desire to go to college, and concluded that
46. 325 F. Supp. at 1065.
47. The reason for such a provision was to prevent "sandbagging," a
practice of acquiring large handicaps for tournament play. 356 F.2d at 374.
48. Id. at 376.
49. 325 F. Supp. at 1065.
50. 358 F.2d at 170.
51. The court further notes that a per se approach should be applied to
both commercial and non-commercial boycotts, 356 F.2d at 376. But see
United States v. United States Trotting Association, 1960 Trade Cas.
1169,761 (1960).
52. 356 F.2d at 376.
53. 190 F. Supp. at 242.
the four-year rule extends beyond what would be considered a
minimum restraint.!4 Further, the financial necessity of the rule
to the owners,5 5 the desire to allow athletes to complete their edu-
cation, and the provision of an inexpensive farm system for the
N.B.A. do not change the legal status or the four-year rule under
any analysis.5"
Although Haywood could have applied the rule of reason to the
four-year rule,57 and probably achieved the identical result, the
theory which Haywood expounded was supported by recent Ap-
pellate and Supreme Court decisions and was based on sound legal
reasoning. It is also evident that Haywood, by necessitating pro-
cedural due process, provides future antitrust courts with less dis-
cretion in determining the merits of a group boycott, as lack of no-
tice and an opportunity to be heard will result in the immediate
illegality of the concerted refusal to deal. Therein lies the true
significance of Haywood: viz., how will Haywood's rejection of the
more flexible rule of reason affect future antitrust problems in the
group boycott area, especially in the field of professional sports?
One important ramification of Haywood is the potential illegality
of the player draft in professional sports. The drafting of players
into professional leagues is practiced by all major team sports in
the United States. Although each sport may vary its procedure
slightly, the player draft basically allows the selection of eligible
athletes by teams in inverse order of their previous season's stand-
ing in the league. Once selected, no other team may negotiate for
the athlete's services. The purpose of this procedure is to allow
weaker teams to increase their ability by acquiring the top amateur
athletes, thereby increasing competition throughout the league.
Whether the draft actually succeeds in its goal is arguable, and for
the purposes of this article, immaterial. What is beyond dispute
is that the draft results in a situation in which a player may nego-
tiate with only one team in each league.5 s This practice, besides
54. 325 F. Supp. at 1066.
55. "There is nothing in the legislative history or policies of the Sher-
man Act to indicate that individuals should be privileged to form groups
to inflict economic harm on others for their own benefit." Bird, Sherman
Act Limitations on Non-Commercial Concerted Refusals to Deal, supra
note 35, at 263.
56. 325 F. Supp. at 1066.
57. See p. 417-418 supra.
58. This results in negotiating with only one team in the country, as
baseball and football have but one major league. Basketball appears to
be in the process of following suit as the proposed merger between the
N.B.A. and the A.B.A. has passed the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the
culmination of the proposal appears to be merely a matter of time.
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restraining an athlete's freedom of choice,59 eliminates competitive
bidding for an athlete's services, thus restricting his salary poten-
tial. It is also evident that there is a concerted refusal on the part
of the league members to negotiate with an athlete drafted by an-
other team. This is clearly a situation wherein league teams, in
concert, refuse to deal with a player unless the particular team
has, in fact, drafted the player and is thus a group boycott,60 much
the same as is the four-year rule.61 It follows that regardless of the
reasonableness or benefit of the player draft to professional team
sports, under the reasoning of Haywood, the lack of procedural
safeguards in player drafts will result in the compulsory determi-
nation that the practice is illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.02
If a court does, in fact, follow Haywood's lead in the case of the
player draft, professional sport leagues may be forced to revise
their strictures. Certainly it is possible that Congress will grant
an antitrust exemption for the draft, in an attempt to "save" pro-
fessional sports. The leagues may revise the draft procedure so
as to conform to the law, or athletes may rely on collective bar-
gaining procedures to enact fundamental changes. It is also con-
ceivable that the leagues will be forced to adjust themselves so
they are able to operate effectively without the aide of the player
draft. This latter alternative may prove to be a difficult task.
Without the player draft, and with competitive bidding among all
teams for all players, it is possible that outrageously inflated con-
tractual offers to athletes may result in driving financially poorer
teams out of the league, and, in the long run, create a small group
of "super-teams." However, it is just as plausible that team own-
59. Sen. Sam J. Ervin (D-N.C.) stated that the draft provisions "are com-
parable to the newspaper profession deciding that a college journalism
graduate could either work for the newspaper in Anchorage, Alaska, at
the salary offered or not work at all." quoted in BusINEss WEEK, Oct. 9,
1971, at 60.
60. The player draft has been categorized in other terms. See Jacobs
and Winters, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes:
Of Super Stars in Peonage, 81 YALE .... 1 (1971); Note, The Super Bowl
and the Sherman Act: Professional Team Sports and the Antitrust Laws,
81 HARV. L. REv. 418, 425 (1968).
61. See p. 415-416 supra.
62. "There is substantial probability in light of all the evidence pre-
sented to this Court that the so-called 'college draft system' . constitutes
a violation of the antitrust laws." 325 F. Supp. at 1056.
ers, recognizing a potential problem, will revert to a financially
prudent and businesslike approach to team management in hopes
of keeping the professional league structure much the same as we
know it today. In any event if Haywood's rationale is adopted by
future courts, some changes in the structure of professional sports
must follow. 0 3
In conclusion, the illegality of the four-year rule represents a
significant step toward wider application of the antitrust laws to
professional sports. If Haywood's reasoning is followed, established
procedures of the sports industry, such as the player draft, may
also be declared illegal. Such occurrences will certainly lead to
new problems which the hierarchy of sports must face. In fact,
the key to the future success or failure of professional sports may
well be found in the reaction made by team and league officials to
these new challenges.
JEFFREY GARLAND
63. Among the changes, other than the player draft, will be the necessity
of applying procedural safeguards to all eligibility and disciplinary regu-
lations. Such a requirement does not seem to put any undue burden upon
the leagues and few serious problems should result. Reserve and option
clauses may also be declared illegal under Haywood's rationale unless
collective bargaining or congressional action intercedes.
